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(See caption.)
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Department erred in finding that Appellant could
not "spend down" his assets to become eligible for Medicaid?
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF
ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Allen v, Utah Dept. of Health, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App.
Mar. 17, 1992).
Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health. Case No. 910287-CA (Utah Ct.
App. filed Mar. 17, 1992).
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal from the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, identified above, which affirmed the "Final Agency Action
and Order on Review" of the Utah Department of Health, Division of
Health Care Financing, Rod Betit, Director, dated April 29, 1991,
in

Case

No.

91-067-01

and

the

"Response

to

Request

for

Reconsideration" of the Utah Department of Health Care Financing,
Rod Betit, Director, dated June 6, 1991, in Case No. 91-067-01.
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16, 782a-4 (1953 & Supp. 1990).

(This is a petition to review an

administrative

having

agency

order

the priority

of

argument

designated under Rule 29(b)(15) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
2

Procedure.)
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONSf STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Administrative Code R810-304-411 (1991).
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(34) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
(See Appendix for copies of these provisions.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a denial of Medicaid assistance dated
February 19, 1991. Record, at 113 (hereinafter "R"). A prehearing
conference was held on March 12, 1991. R. 108. A hearing was held
on April 3, 1991. Appellant, Doyce Allen (hereinafter "Allen") was
not represented by counsel at his administrative hearing.

R. 97.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts
On April 29, 1991, Allen, received an unfavorable "Final
Agency Action and Order on Review," which found that Allen was over
the asset limit for Medicaid coverage. R. 94-106. A "Response to
Request for Reconsideration," dated June 6, 1991, confirmed this
decision.

R. 78-80.

Medicaid assistance having been denied at the agency level,
this appeal followed.

R. 88-91.

Allen was not represented by

counsel until after this appeal was filed.

3

R. 84-85, 88-91.

Relevant Facts Supported by Citations to the
Record and to the Opinion of the Court of Appeals
Doyce Allen is 64 years old. R. 7, 98. He had a heart attack
on January 23, 1991. R. 5; Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, Case No.
910287-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1992) [hereafter
Allen]. . He is also ineligible for Medicare because he is not 65
years

old yet.

R.

9-10.

Allen had worked

for years

at

Intermountain Farmers and had been covered by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield insurance. R. 98. After retirement and after his insurance
benefits were ending, Allen worked part-time at Intermountain
Farmers to save money to pay premiums for Blue Cross/Blue Shield
insurance, which he was denied on account of previous heart
surgery. R. 6, 33-37, 124-28 (application). Allen considered the
price of any other insurance to be prohibitive.

R. 37.

It also

appeared that any other insurance company may have denied coverage
regardless of the amount of the premium he would have been willing
to pay.

R. 98.

Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991.
11, 98; Allen, at 1.

R.

His application included a request for

retroactive benefits for January 1991, to cover approximately
$40,000.00 in medical bills incurred at Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center. R. 11-13, 98; Allen, at 1. These bills relate to
4

Allen's heart attack.

R. 11; Allen. at 1.

By the time he was

admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for open-heart
surgery, Allen was already obligated for $4,997.55 to Air Evac for
air ambulance services rendered on January 26, 1991, in Phoenix,
Arizona; $554.00 to Dr. Nudelman for critical care given on January
23-26, 1991; and, $9,649.10 to Havasu Samaritan Regional Hospital
for hospitalization from January 23-26, 1991.

R. 133-37, 140.

Thereafter he incurred medical bills in the amounts of $304.50 to
Valley Ambulance,

Inc. for life flight on January 26, 1991;

$1,495.00 to Dr. Frischknecht for hospital treatment from January
26-February 1, 1991; $5,025.00 to Dr. Smith for treatment on
January 27, 1991; $23,626.58 to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center
for hospitalization from January 26, 1991 to February 1, 1991. R.
138-39, 141-44.
An analysis of Allen's assets found that he and his wife held
$3,029.00 in a savings account and $100.00 in a checking account
as of the first moment of each of the months of January and
February, 1991. R. 98; Allen at 1-2. It was also found that Allen
owned a 1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately $2,500.00,
which could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile and
a $7,000.00, 1981 travel trailer.

R. 98; Allen at 2.

Allen was denied Medicaid by the Office of Family Support
because his resources were $10,745.90 and the resource limit was
5

$3,000.00.

R. 113; Allen at 2.

Following a fair hearing, the

Department affirmed the decision of the Office of Family Support,
finding that Allen's savings account exceeded the limit.
Allen at 2.

R. 99;

The value ascribed to Allen's motor vehicles and

travel trailer were not considered necessary to sustain a denial.
R. 99.1

However, it was argued and left undecided whether the

truck and travel trailer could be excluded as medical necessities
for Allen's wife.

R. 52-59, 67-68, 98.

An issue was also raised as to whether the savings account
fund was being held for burial expenses.

R. 68-69.

The Court of

Appeals held that the savings account was not an exempt burial
fund.

Allen at 2-4.

An additional issue was raised that Allen should have been
allowed to
Medicaid.

"spend down" his assets

in order to qualify for

R. 130. At the hearing it was found that "spenddowns"

are only permitted with regard to income, not assets.

R. 16-19.

He also incurred many medical bills in January prior to his
surgery, which he could have spent down. R. 135-45. The Court of
Appeals, one judge dissenting, found that a resource spenddown is
not available in Utah.

Allen at 12-13.

x

. It appears that there is no "scope of service" problem
and that Appellant's open-heart surgery would be paid for by
Medicaid if he was found eligible. R. 22.
6

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT A RESOURCE
SPENDDOWN WAS NOT REQUIRED IN A REASONABLE EVALUATION OF
A MEDICAID RECIPIENT'S RESOURCES.
The Court of Appeals panel majority rejected Allen's argument
that his savings account was a burial fund and it further rejected
the argument that Allen should have been allowed to spend down his
resources. Allen does not seek review of the panel's ruling on the
burial fund in this petition, but contends that the Court of
Appeals' decision regarding a resource spenddown is an important
question of state and federal law which should be settled by the
Supreme Court.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procdure, Rule 46(d).

The nature of the Medicaid program and the distinction between
"categorically needy" and "medically needy" are well presented in
the previous briefing and in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

The

majority panel correctly notes that an income spend down has always
been required, but that courts are split as to whether a resource
spend down is a necessary part of the medically needy program.
The parties are in agreement that a resource spend down is
permitted under the Medicaid statute; The key question is whether
it is required as a necessary part of a Medicaid plan.
The panel majority erred in focusing its attention on whether
the Utah Medicaid Plan, or the Utah legislature, had "adopted" a
resource spenddown.

Allen has never contended that a resource
7

spenddown was formally adopted by the legislature. Instead, he has
maintained throughout that a spend down of resources must be
allowed, if determinations of eligibility are to be reasonably
done. The majority panel engaged in a fruitless search of the Utah
Medical Assistance Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 et. seq., for
language to guide its resolution of the resource spend down issue.
Predictably, it found nothing, since the legislature has delegated
to

the

Department

of

Health

Care

Financing

(DHCF)

complete

administrative authority over the entire Medicaid program.

Not

only does the statute under review say nothing about a "resource
spend down", it does not even mention the medically needy program.
It is a futile exercise to search for guidance on this issue in a
statute which says nothing about the purpose of the medically needy
program or any other program operated under Medicaid.

As Judge

Bench correctly pointed out in dissent, the section of the Utah
code

surveyed

by

the

majority

panel

regarding

economy

and

efficiency in the administration of the Medicaid program "does not
have any logical relationship to the intended coverage of the
program".

(Emphasis in the original).

Allen. at 12.

The majority panel is also incorrect in concluding that the
state court decisions which have upheld a resource spenddown have
found some explicit authorization in a state statute.

The two

cases reviewed by the panel, Haley v. Commissioner of Public

8

Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E. 2d. 572 (1985) and Hess ion v.
Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 111. 2d. 535, 544 N.E. 2d.
751 (1989) reviewed general statutory language regarding the intent
of a medically needy program to preserve the limited resources of
indigent clients, but the statute did not explicitly address the
application of a

"resource spend down" in a medically needy

program.2
The majority panel was also influenced by language in the
Hession opinion to the effect that the Illinois legislature noted
it was "of special importance that [medically needy recipients']
incentives for continued independence be maintained and that their
limited resources be preserved." Allen, at 10. Such a purpose is
implicit whenever a state authorizes participation in the Medicaid
program.

Having authorized such participation typically a state

leaves it to the state Medicaid agency to determine which optional
programs it will make available to its eligible recipients.

In

Utah's case, the DHCF has chosen to operate a medically needy
program, which results in the additional spending of several
million dollars.

The Utah legislature has never disapproved of

Contrary to the panel's statement, the statute "explicitly
applying a resource spenddown" in Haley. concerned the availability
of this rule in a transfer of assets situation. This is a rare
circumstance, and not the more general set of circumstances under
review in this case. Haley, 476 N.E. 2d at 579, n. 9 as cited in
Allen, at 10.
9

DHCF's decision to offer a medically needy option.

It is DHCF

which decides whether to allow a resource spenddown.
The authority delegated to DHCF to operate a Medicaid program
carries with it the responsibility to comply with the Medicaid Act
so that its purpose will be carried out. The purpose of Title XIX
is "to furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of families with
dependent children and of aged, blind or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services."
1985).3

42 U.S.C.S. § 1396 (Law. Co-op.

Title XIX "was "designed to liberalize Federal law . . .

so as to make medical services for the needy more generally
available.'"

Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 394 Mass.

466, 475, 476 N.E.2d 572, 578 (1985) (quoting Sen. Rep. 404, 89th
Cong. 1st Sess.), reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1943, 2014.
eligibility

"[T]o fulfill this goal, Congress sought to ensure
to

individuals

prevented eligibility

with

income

and

resources

which

for other programs when the income and

3

Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-2.1 and 26-18-3(2)
(1989)
specifically incorporate Title XIX and other federal law and
regulations into Utah's Medicaid program.
This implies that a
resource spenddown is also necessary to fulfill the purposes of
Utah's Medicaid program. Another court has likewise found that a
resource spenddown is required by a state law provision which
parallels and implements the federal objective contained in 42
U.S.C. § 1396. Hession 163 111. App. 2d at 559-61, 516 N.E.2d at
824.
10

resources were exceeded by incurred medical costs."

Id. at 475,

476 N.E.2d at 578 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17)) . In this case
Allen's liquid assets put him $129.00 over the limit, not counting
his vehicles which were arguably exempt.

The bills for his

necessary medical services were over $40,000.

R. 11-13, 98, 113.

By refusing to require a resource spend down, the majority panel
defeats the purpose of Title XIX as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396,
since the expenses of Allen's emergency medical services can only
be met by exhausting all of his resources.

Not even the $3000 in

assets protected under the medically needy program will be spared.
Congressional intent to include a resource spenddown in the
Medicaid Act is also found in the provision allowing retroactive
application to establish eligibility for the three months before
the month of application.
1985).

42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(34) (Law. Co-op

By this provision, Congress intended to make medical

assistance available to applicants who were unable to apply at the
time they became ill, due to the severity of their illness or
because of other factors.

It is consistent with congressional

intent to allow an applicant both the right and some time to spend
down excess assets so as to become eligible for medical assistance.
If Mr. Allen had been informed of the spenddown requirements, he
would have spent down his excess assets for his medical expenses
within that month, thereby making himself eligible for medical
11

assistance.

He was already obligated for over $15,000 of medical

bills (far in excess of his assets) by the time he arrived in Utah
for open-heart surgery.

R. 133-37, 140.

Instead, Allen was

"blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply because it is
so illogical."

Kempson v. North Carolina Department of Human

Resources, 397 S.E. 2d. 314f 318 (N.C. 1990).
In his dissenting opinion in this case, Judge Bench agreed
that a resource spend down must be allowed if this unreasonable
result is to be avoided:
I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is
reasonable since eligibility is determined by when the
medically needy applicant applies for benefits. Under
DHCF's policy, the applicant who is savvy enough to spend
down his or her assets before applying for medicaid would
be eligible, while the applicant who applies for benefits
before spending down is not eligible.
Because that
agency policy is not reasonable, I would allow Allen to
spend down his assets before his eligibility is
determined.
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for
further proceedings.
Allen, at 13.

A standard for determining eligibility is not

reasonable unless it includes the opportunity to offset excess
resources against incurred medical expenses.

See Sen. Rep. No.

404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2019 (states are not allowed to require the use
of income or resources which would bring the individual's income
below the amount set as the test of eligibility under the state
12

plan

because

this would

reduce

the person

below

the

level

determined by the state as necessary for his maintenance).

A

person who is unable actually to spend down his assets would become
liable to the full extent of his resources, including resources
which Congress intended to be retained by the applicant.

In Haley

the court said:
The department's policy of determining eligibility
without the application of a resource spend down does
not comply with the requirement that an individual be
allowed to retain a certain level of resources.
Haley, 476 N.E.2d at 579.

See also Walter 0. Boswell Hospital,

Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 388, 714 P.2d 878, 881
(1986) (a case concerning a county health program, where the court
analogized to Medicaid law, interpreting the Medicaid Act under
Haley as requiring a resource spenddown in order to comply with the
requirement that an individual be allowed to retain a reasonable
level of both resources and income).
The

Illinois

Supreme Court, reached the same result

in

Hession;
By failing to consider an individual's incurred
medical
expenses as well as his or her assets, the
Department defeats the legislature's intent. Under the
Department's policy, a Medicaid applicant possessing
resources in excess of the asset disregard is found to
be ineligible for medical assistance despite the fact
that the applicant may have incurred medical expenses
which far exceed his or her resources.
Because the
applicant is not eligible for assistance, he or she
becomes personally responsible for paying these bills
and is required to deplete the assets which the
13

legislature intended to be disregarded.
In contrast, by allowing an applicant to spend down
the assets above the disregard with incurred medical
expenses the applicant is entitled to Medicaid benefits
once the medical expenses exceed the excess in assets.
Thus an individual is allowed to retain a certain level
of assets and is personally liable for his or her medical
expenses only to the extent that his or her resources
exceed permissible limits. Considering the legislature's
intent that the medically needy be allowed to retain some
of their assets, we conclude that the Department must
employ resource spend down methodology when determining
Medicaid eligibility for these individuals.
Hession, 129 111. 2d at 549-50, 544 N.E.2d at 758.
The cases relied on by Allen approved of a resource spenddown
for the fundamental reason that the exemption of certain assets so
as to permit an individual to maintain a minimum level of income
and resources while still qualifying for medical assistance is an
inherent part of a medically needy program.

See Walter 0. Boswell

Hospital, Inc. v. Yavapai County. 148 Ariz. 385,

, 714 P.2d 878,

883 (1986); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, 129 111. 2d
535,

, 544 N.E.2d 751, 758 (1989); Haley v. Commissioner of

Public Welfare, 394 Mass. 466,

, 476 N.E.2d 572, 579 (1985).

The Court of Appeals erred in its reading of these cases and its
conclusion that each contains a "state mandate for vresource spend
down' based on a specific legislative directive within their
Medicaid plans" is unwarranted. Allen, at 9. The DHCF regulations
providing for the exemption of certain assets so that a claimant

14

can maintain a certain level of resources while remaining eligible
for medical assistance are a sufficient basis for permitting a
resource spend down in Utah. Utah Administrative Code § R810-304411 (1991).
CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals,
as

recommended

by

Judge

Bench, Allen

at

12-13

(Bench,

J.,

dissenting), and find that a resource spenddown applies and that
the Appellant should have been allowed to spend down his assets.
He should have been allowed to reduce his assets so as to become
eligible for Medicaid.

Dated this jgfK day of

Apy^\

1992.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By Steven Elmo Averett
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6<39 CA«rON DRIVE
StRLUGVlLLE

3A1-1
UT

84663

DENr - ASSETS EZCE-ED LIHITS
DEAR DOYCE ALLEN
YOUR APPLICATION FOR HEDICAL ASSISTANCE, RECEIVED ON FEBRUARY 04,
1991, HAS 3EEN DENIED. THIS IS BECAUSE THE VALUE OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD'S
TOTAL RESOURCES IS MORE THAN OUR POLICY ALLOWS.
YOUR RESOURCES
RLSOUdCc

LlfllT

$10,745.90
$3,000.00

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT
801 374 7800. COLLECT CALLS WILL BE ACCEPTED.
THIS AC::0.< IS 3ASED ON VOLUHE IIIF, SECTIONS 503 AND 361, 70LUME
H I D , SECTION 503, LSD VOLUflE Ilia, SECTION 502.
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
Suzanne Dandoy. M.D.. M.P.H.
Ex<vuuvr Director
Rod Beiit
Director

288 North 1460 West
P.O. Box 16580
Sal! Lake City. Utah 84118-0580
(801)538-6151

D0YCE ALLEN,
Petitioner,

FINAL AGENCY ACTION
AND ORDER ON REVIEW
Case No. 91-067-01

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A RECONSIDERATION
FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A
PETITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR
A RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU M Y DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6151.
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section
63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review Procedure," and Department of Health Administrative Rule RA54-14, entitled
"Division of Health Care Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for
Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and Providers."

WAS THE OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT (OFS) CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS OVER THE ASSET LIMIT?
' • •

'

••

I 'IN DINGS C I !: CT

The Findings of Fact entered by the presiding officer In Recommended Decision
No. 91-067-01 are hereby incorporated >w refprence.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Conclusions of La w entered by the presiding officer in Recommended
Decision No 9] -067-01 are hereby incorporated by reference.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 is hereby AFFIRMED.

REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION
The rules regarding asset limits are set forth in Assistance Payments
Administration (APA) Volume III, Section 503. Section 503-1 states in
relevant part:
To be eligible for medical assistance, a client's
countable assets must be less than the applicable asset
limits....
Section 503-2 states in relevant part:
Use assets held on the first moment of a calendar month
to compute eligibility for that month. The case is
ineligible for the entire month if countable assets
exceed limits on the first moment of the month....
The table in Section 503-3 indicates that the Medicaid asset limit for a
household of two individuals is $3,000.
In this case, the petitioner and his wife held over $3,000 in a savings
account at the first moment of the month for the months of January and
February, 1991. Jherefore, the decision of 0FS to deny Medicaid disability
benefits because of excess assets was correct.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Action and Crder
on Review is issued, you may file a written request for reconsideration with
the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. Any request for
reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking
judicial review.
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action
and Order on Review or, if a request for reconsideration is filed and denied,
within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the
specific grounds upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition
within the 30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of any right to appeal
the Final Agency Action and Order on Review.
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A copy of this Final Agency Action and Order on Review shall be sent to
Petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail,
return receipt requested.

DATED this

^ 9 ^

day of April, 1991

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director

Rod Betit, Director
Division of Health Care Financing
Her Designated and Authorized Representative

0414H/115-117
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STATE OF UTAH
00O00

DOYCE ALLEN,
RECOMMENDED DECISION

Petitioner,
vs.

CASE NO.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

91-067-01

DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

Pursuant to Rule R454-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah
Administrative Hearing Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq., Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above
captioned case was held on the 3rd day of April, 1991, at the Office of Family
Support located at 150 East Center Street, Provo, Utah, at 10:00 o'clock in
the A.M., Cornelius W. Hyzer, Hearing Officer, presiding. The petitioner
appeared in person. The Office of Family Support/Utah Medical Assistance
Program ("UMAP") was represented by Jon Wood and Patti Richards. This hearing
was scheduled verbally and without written notice. Neither party was
represented by counsel.

ISSUE
WERE THE ASSETS OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE THE ASSET LIMIT FOR THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1991?
The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife, Lilly, have severe medical
problems. She is receiving Social Security disability benefits for chronic
bronchitis* She is on continuous oxygen for this disorder. She also has to
be transported to a warmer climate in the winter time when an inversion takes
place in the Utah County because of her condition. To accomplish this
purpose, her husband, Doyce Allen, purchased a 1983 Ford pick-up truck and a
travel trailer. They paid $8,000.00, for the travel trailer two years ago.
He and his wife used the cash from her Social Security disability hearing to
do that. The hearing process to obtain Social Security disability required
them to go to the administrative law judge, and by the time benefits were
granted, the retroactive benefits exceeded $8,000.00.

Doyce Allen worked at Intermountain Farmers Co-op for many years and was
covered under Blue Cross/Blue Shield medical insurance. In 1990, he obtained
a part-time job with his former employer and reapplied for Blue Cross/Blue
Shield benefits. He was covered under COBRA benefits until July 1, 1990. A
letter was sent by his employer with the application on June 15, 1990. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield denied his application for benefits for medical insurance.
He looked for other insurance and determined that it would cost between
$400.00 or $500.00 a month for medical insurance, and therefore, he never
applied. He testified at the hearing that an application to one of these
other companies may have been denied regardless of the amount of the premium
he would have been willing to pay.
In January, 1991, the petitioner suffered a heart attack and had heart-bypass
surgery. This medical bill remains unpaid.
The petitioner applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. His income
was not evaluated, but at the hearing it was determined there would be a
substantial spendown required in the range of $400.00 to 450.00. The asset
limit for a family of two is $3,000.00, and the Office of Family Support
determined that he exceeded that on the basis of his savings account alone.
The savings account contained $3,029.86 throughout the month of January and up
to February 6, 1991, at which time Mrs. Allen withdrew the entire balance of
that account.
The petitioner was informed at the hearing that the rule for asset
determination requires that the evaluation take place on the first moment of
the first day of each month and, therefore, because the funds in his checking
and savings account were in excess of $3,000.00, the case was properly
denied. Considerable discussion was also entertained on the use of the truck
and travel trailer for medical purposes, but the amount of the money in the
savings account alone exceeded the limit, and therefore, the issue of medical
necessity was moot.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife Lilly, age 52, applied
for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991.

2.

The application of the petitioner included a request for retroactive
benefits for January, 1991, to cover approximately $40,000.00 in medical
bills incurred at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for open-heart
surgery.

3.

Lilly Allen, the petitioner's wife, is currently on Social Security
Disability and requires continuous oxygen for chronic bronchitis, as well
as trips to warmer climates during the winter time as a medical necessity.

4.

The petitioner and his wife held $3,029.00 in a savings account and
approximately $100.00, in a checking account the first moment of each of
the months of January and February, 1991.

5.

The petitioner owns a 1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately
$2,500.00, which could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile
and a $7,000.00, 1981 travel trailer.
Vaof>

9

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The assets of the petitioner and his spouse exceed the $3,000.00, asset limit
as set forth in APA Volume H I D .

REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION
The petitioner was unable to demonstrate his assets were below the asset limit
and, therefore, he failed to meet his burden of proof. Many alternatives were
explored to try to determine that a correct decision was made by the Office of
Family Support. After careful review with the petitioner of regulations
requiring that his assets be determined as of the first moment of each month,
the petitioner understood that his savings account alone exceeded the limit.
Therefore, the value ascribed to his motor vehicles and the travel trailer
were not necessary to sustain a denial.

RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION
The decision of the Office of Family Support to deny Medicaid benefits because
of excess assets is hereby AFFIRMED.

RIGHT TO REVIEW
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the
Recc—ended Decision and a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of
that review, will be released simultaneously by the Department of Health,
Division of Health Care Financing.

DA7ZZ this

'

day of April, 1991.

CORNELIUS W. HYZER
HEARING OFFICER
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EXHIBITS

The following exhibits were

admitted into evidence:

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT #1

Medicaid application of the petitioner,
Doyce Allen

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT //2

Checking account and savings account
bank statements

0404H/105-108/amh

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Norman H Banjitrttr
Gcnrrnor

Suzanne Dandoy. M D. M P H
ExcctiUvr Dirrvfor

Rod Bern
Director

288 North 1460 West
PO Box 16580
San Lake City. Utah 841160580
(801)538-6151
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D0YCE ALLEN,
Petitioner,

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION

v.
Case No. 91-067-01

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

-00O00-

This request for Reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63--6b-13 Utah
Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

FACTS
The Facts set forth in Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 are here:
incorporated by reference.

DISPOSITION
The above-captioned Request for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION
The petitioner, age 64, became uninsurable and had a heart attack on January
23, 1991, while visiting in Arizona. The petitioner and his wife had enough
money to return to Utah for bypass surgery. Throughout January, 1991, and up
to February 6, 1991, the petitioner and his wife had $3,029 in_a savings
account and approximately $100 in a checking account. After applying for
Medicaid on February 4, 1991, the petitioner's wife immediately withdrew all
the money in the savings account and closed the account. Medicaid regulations
require that the assets of an applicant be examined at the first moment of the
month to determine whether or not they exceed the asset limit. The asset
limit for the type of Medicaid requested was $3,000.00, leaving excess assets

In addition to the excess assets in the checking and savings account, there
were other potential excess assets
an unencumbered trailer home worth
approximately $7,000.00, and an automobile worth $600,00. At the formal
hearing, the petitioner contended that the trailer was a medical necessity.
The hearing officer's Recommended Decision correctly denied the petitioner's
claim solely on the amount of cash available to him, without reaching the
medical necessity issue.
The Utah Medicaid Program is funded by a combination of state and federal
funds. Unfortunately, federal regulations do not allow consideration of
individual circumstances in the application of income and asset limits. A
Medicaid agency must use a methodology for the treatment of resources that is
uniform for all individuals in a covered group. When income eligibility is
the issue, a Medicaid recipient may spenddown excess income each month to
"buy" a medical card. However, no such provisions exists to reduce assets.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Response to Request
for Reconsideration. The petition shall be served upon the Director of Health
Care Financing, Utah Department of Health and shall state the specific grounds
upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the
30-day time limit may constitute a wavier of any right to appeal this decision.
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the
petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail,
return receipt requested.
DATED this

day of June, 1991

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director

By ;

^df^u^

Rod Betit, Director
Division of Health Care Financing
Her Designated and Authorized Representative

0448H/43-44
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No:

91-067-01

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 6th day of June, 1991, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Response to Request for Reconsideration, postage
prepaid, to the following parties:
Rod Betit, Director
Division of Health Care Financing
INTER OFFICE MAIL
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Doyce Allen
689 Canyon Drive
Springville, Utah

84663

Brian Farr
Office of the Attorney General
DHS, 4th Floor
INTER OFFICE MAIL
Bob Banta
DHS, Office of Family Support
INTER OFFICE MAIL
Stephanie Mallory
DHS, Administrative Hearings
INTER OFFICE MAIL
Jeanie LeBlanc, Medicaid Supervisor
DHS, Quality Control
INTER OFFICE MAIL
Mike O'Brien, Associate Regional Director
Office of Family Support
150 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84606
Jon Wood, Supervisor
Office of Family Support
150 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84606

Ginny DTSrcan
0379H/26

FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter,

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Doyce A l l e n ,

MAR 1 T 1 9 9 2
^CWtfry 7 .%k>onan
Ctitk c: tfcs Court
Utafi Court c; Appeals
OPINION

(For P u b l i c a t i o n )

Petitioner,
Case No. 910287-CA

v.
Utah Department of Health,
Division of Health Care
Financing,

F I L E D
(March 1 7 , 1992)

Respondent.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from a final order of
respondent Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care
Financing (DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart atrack while in
Arizona. He was subsequently transported to Utah where he
underwent heart bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs
exceeding $4 0,000.00. At the time of his heart attack, Allen had
no health insurance and was ineligible for Medicare assistance
because he was not sixty-five years old.
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991,
seeking retroactive coverage to include medical bills incident to
his heart surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid guidelines
require that Alleys assets be less than $3,000.00, on the first
of each calendar month, to qualify for medical assistance. In
both January and February, Allen owned a savings account in the

amount of $3,029.86, a checking account in the amount of $100,00,
a Lincoln automobile valued at approximately $600.00, a 1983 Ford
pickup truck valued at approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00.
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family Support denied
Allen's Medicaid application, finding his resources exceeded the
$3,000.00 limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after which a
DHCF hearing officer sustained the denial on the ground that
Allen's "savings account alone exceeded the limit." On April 29,
1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency Action and Order on Review,
adopting the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer.
Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied.
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in denying his
Medicaid application because: (1) The savings account funds are
designated for burial expenses and, thus, exempt from
consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel trailer,
modified to accommodate his wife's disabilities, is a medical
necessity or personal effect and, thus, exempt from consideration
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have been permitted
to "spend down" his assets, by applying them to medical bills, in
order to become eligible for Medicaid.
I.

THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A BURIAL FUND

Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings account should not
be included for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because it is
exempt as a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen points
to a statement in his will directing that the savings account be
used "to bury Doyce Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the
will is properly before this court on appeal because it was
submitted to the DHCF with his Request for Reconsideration. The
DHCF responds that it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's
will as part of the record on review because it was never
introduced as evidence at Allen's formal administrative hearing.
A review of the record reveals that a copy of Allen's will
was first presented to the DHCF as an attachment to a letter from
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requesting a transcript of
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 burial or
funeral fund exemption for each eligible household member" is
permitted only if these funds "are separately identified and not
commingled with other funds. They must be clearly designated so
that an outside observer can see that these funds are
specifically for the client's burial expense." Utah Code Admin.
P. R810-304-411(9) (e) (1) (1991).

Allen's administrative hearing. The DHCF did not receive the
will until June 10, 19912, after the hearing officer's
Recommended Decision, the DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request for Reconsideration
had already been signed and dated. Because there is no
indication that Allen's will was ever included as evidence before
the DHCF, it is not properly a part of Allen's record on appeal.
However, even if we were to consider the general language in
Allen's will, the result would not be different. Allen clearly
and unequivocally testified the account was to pay for insurance
premiums, not burial expenses. Allen did not specify the account
as a burial fund on his original Medicaid application. During
his formal administrative hearing, Allen did not argue or present
any evidence indicating his savings account was designated for
burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing officer specifically
asked if the savings account might be a burial fund, Allen
replied that "we earned it last summer for our insurance
premiums, and they didn't go through, so we had this money for a
nest egg, you might say. You have to have a little bit of
something in case—." 3 Therefore, considering only the savings

2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time when the
record was still open," pointing out that the letter to which the
will was attached was mailed on June 3, 1991. The letter,
nevertheless, clearly bears a "Received June 10, 1991" stamp.
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF denied Medicaid
benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain the account as a
burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the
administrative hearing:
HEARING OFFICER: What did you do with the
$3,000 in February which you pulled out of
the savings account?
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that was
accrued during our heart attack deal here,
and transportation to and from.
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money was spent on
medical things?
MR. ALLEN: Bills again.
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently neither
considered nor used the savings account as a fund "separately
identifiable" which was set aside "specifically" for burial
expenses.

Q T n~> on —r>7i
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account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, Allen's savings
account alone surpassed the $3,000.00 Medicaid limit.
II.
A.

MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN"

An Overview of the Medicaid Program

Allen alternatively argues that he should have been
permitted to spend his assets on medical bills in order to
qualify for Medicaid. We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid
regulations to resolve this question.
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program as Title
XIX of the Social Security Act.5 Medicaid is a cooperative
federal-state program providing federal funds to assist
individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1992). States choosing to participate in this optional program
are reimbursed for a portion of their costs in providing medical
treatment to needy persons. See Atkins v. Rivera. 477 U.S. 154,
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber Memorial Care Ctr.,
Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Participating states must develop a plan that complies with
all federal Medicaid regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins,
477 U.S. at 157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 P.2d at
832. Each state must also select a single agency "to administer
or to supervise the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) (5) (1992). In determining eligibility for its
program, a state must provide benefits to the "categorically
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped with
oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport Allen and his wife
to a warmer climate during winter because of his wife's ill
health, should be excluded from Medicaid eligibility
consideration because they are exempt either as personal effects
or medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411(4),
(5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen asserts that, because
his wife requires the truck and travel trailer for health
reasons, neither vehicle is "available" to him, as contemplated
by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17)(B) (1992). We find it unnecessary to reach these
issues in view of our determination that Allen's savings account
alone exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit.
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396, et seq. (1992)).

needy"6 but may provide benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its
discretion.8
B.

The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal Medicaid Statutes

When a "medically needy" applicant's income or resources
exceed the applicable state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the
"spend down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the applicant may
be able to "spend down" excess income or assets, by applying them
to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for Medicaid.
In determining whether the federal Medicaid program requires
states to adopt the "spend down" rule, courts have focused on the
following portion of the Medicaid statutes:
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must

(17) . . . include reasonable standards
. • . for determining eligibility for and the
extent of medical assistance under the plan
which (A) are consistent with the objectives
of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking
into account only such income and resources
as are . . . available to the applicant or
recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable
evaluation of any such income or resources,
6.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).

7.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii).

8. The United States Supreme Court explained this distinction in
Schweiker v. Hoaan. 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2597 (1982):
Congress has differentiated between the
categorically needy—a class of aged, blind,
disabled, or dependent persons who have very
little income—and other persons with similar
characteristics who are self-supporting.
Members of the former class are automatically
entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter
class are not eligible unless a State elects
to provide benefits to the medically needy
and unless their income, after consideration
of medical expenses, is below state standards
of eligibility.
Id., 457 U.S. at 590, 102 S. Ct. at 2609.

91n9«7-ra

and (D) • . . provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with respect to
income by taking into account . . . the costs
. . . incurred for medical care or for any
other type of remedial care recognized under
State lav.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis added).
recognize section 17(D) as the "income spend down
that state plans must permit a Medicaid applicant
or deplete excess income to comply with a state's
standards.9

Courts
rule," finding
to "spend down"
eligibility

The question in the present caser however, is whether the
federal Medicaid regulations also require states to allow an
applicant to "spend down" excess resources in the same manner.
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid program requires states
to implement "resource spend down" because it is necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program and is reasonable.
The DHCF responds that federal Medicaid regulations mandate
"income spend down" but merely permit states to incorporate
"resource spend down" within their plans at their discretion.

9. See, e.g., Atkins. 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct. at 2459 ("the
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17)" allows the
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler. No. 83-C-4736,
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986)("42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) (17) (D) requires states to use income spend-down");
Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me.
Nov. 9, 1990) (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) (D) "specifically requires
the state to have an income spend-down rule"); Walter O. Boswell
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d
878, 881 (Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementing [42
U.S.C. § 1396a(17)] expressly require deduction of incurred
medical bills from inccmo for purposes of determining
eligibility."); Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark.
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990)("Under the ^medically needy7
procedure, applicants are permitted to xspend down' their excess
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub.
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down
principle to income eligibility determinations"); Kempson v.
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1990)(The "explicit reference to income [in 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D)] has been interpreted by the courts to
mean that * income spend-down' is allowed by the statute."),
aff'd, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991).

Courts considering the issue agree with the DHCF, finding
the express statutory mandate is limited to "income spend
down."10 Courts conclude that federal Medicaid regulations
permit, but do not require, states to employ "resource spend
down."11 We agree and conclude "resource spend down" is not
mandated by federal law.

10. Legislative history accompanying section 1396a(a)(17) points
to only "income spend down" as a mandatory federal requirement.
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943.
11. See, e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down but is
silent regarding resource spend-down . . . .
Resource spend-down
is thus permitted, but not required, by the Medicaid statute and
regulations"); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("The federal statute
specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down
rule, . . . But there is no similar requirement in the federal
statute for a resource spend-down rule."); Hession v. Illinois
Dept. of Pub. Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757
(1989)("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in section
1396a(a)(17) which precludes a State that participates in the
Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology
if it chooses to do so."); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub. Aid,
163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("section
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan to utilize resource
spend down in determining an applicant's eligibility for medical
assistance benefits"), aff'd. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751
(1989); Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me.
1991)(court adopts prior holding of district court in this case
that federal Medicaid statute "only permits, and does not
require, a state to use an asset spend-down"); Bemowski v.
Department of Pub. Welfare. 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the medically needy
by participating States is optional and may be excluded entirely
from a State's Medicaid program").
But see Ramsey, 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds "no authority
in any category for a * spend-down' of excess resources that is
similar or identical to the expressly authorized * spend-down' of
excess income"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops short of
holding "resource spend down" discretionary, stating that,
although "§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) only mentions income in instructing
states to provide flexibility in their program application
standards, we note that § 1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's
plan must *provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income
or resources'").
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C.

Utah's Medicaid Program

Since Utah may implement "resource spend down" at its
discretion, we must determine whether the Utah Medicaid plan has,
in fact, adopted "resource spend down" in determining Medicaid
eligibility. Utah courts have never addressed Medicaid "spend
down" issues.
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid program with the
adoption of the Medical Assistance Act in 1981.h Utah has
complied with federal requirements by creating a state plan13,
which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for
Medicaid administration.14 Utah's statutes describe the DHCF's
responsibilities, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of
this chapter in an efficient, economical
manner. The division shall establish, on a
statewide basis, a program to safeguard
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital
admissions or lengths of stay.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989).

12.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -11 (1989 and Supp. 1991).

13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to -48 (1991). Utah has
elected to provide assistance to the "medically needy." See Utah
Code Admin. P. R455-1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination,
including the burial fund discussed earlier, are listed at Utah
Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991).
14. "[T]he Division of Health Care Financing . . . shall be
responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the
Medicaid program . . . in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1
(1989)(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(1)
(Supp. 1991)("The department shall be the single state agency
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in
connection with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security
Act.")(emphasis added).

(2) The department shall develop implementing
policy in conformity with this chapter, the
requirements of Title XIX, and applicable
federal regulations.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added).
The department may develop standards and
administer policies relating to eligibility
under the Medicaid program.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989).
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule
indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend
down" in determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen posits
a more delicate argument which goes beyond literal statutory
language. Specifically, Allen contends that Utah will not be
following the federal requirement to use "reasonable standards"
in determining Medicaid eligibility unless it applies "resource
spend down."
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's Medicaid plan
designates certain assets as exempt in determining eligibility
for the "medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that Utah has
tacitly adopted a policy of allowing "medically needy" Medicaid
applicants to maintain a level of income and resources for the
necessities of life while still qualifying for Medicaid.
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases from other
jurisdictions which, he argues, require "resource spend down"
because, like Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid
eligibility determination. We read these cases differently.
Courts in these jurisdictions have found a state mandate for
"resource spend down" based on a specific legislative directive
within their Medicaid plans, not just on the practice of allowing
exemptions.
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 394 Mass. 466,
476 N.E.2d 572 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its own state
Medicaid laws to determine if "resource spend down" was mandated
or simply permitted. The court, first, determined that, although
the federal statutes did not require "resource spend down," it
was a reasonable method of calculating resources and "consistent
with the goals of Title XIX." Id., 476 N.E.2d at 578.
Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine
15.

£ee Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991).

independently whether the Legislature intended to require the use
of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. The court found a
statute "explicitly applfying] a resource spend down," id. n.9,
as evidence of "the legislature's determination to ensure an
individual's retention of a certain level of resources." Id. at
579. The court, thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid plan
required "resource spend down."
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an analysis similar
to that of the Halev court in Hession v. Illinois Department of
Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not
require, "resource spend down," the court turned its attention to
the Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized that the plan
included a provision whereby $1,500 in assets is exempt from
Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court, relying
upon a specific Illinois statute, also stated: "In establishing
an assistance program for these individuals, the legislature has
noted that it is of special importance that their incentives for
continued independence be maintained and that their limited
resources be preserved.11 Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on this clear
manifestation of legislative intent, the court held that the
Illinois Medicaid plan required "resource spend down."
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource spend down"
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy
expressing a desire to preserve the resources of potential
beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those outlining
16.

In fact, one commentator states:
It is not only conceivable, but a fact that
some unprepared applicants' assets are
reduced beyond the poverty level to
bankruptcy because medical bills in that
month exceed those resources which the
applicant cannot preserve under the Utah
Exemptions Act. It [is] to the applicant's
advantage to put forth any plausible argument
that a particular value should be counted as
income rather than asset, if the reverse
would result in excess assets. Excess assets
mean a denial of Medicaid eligibility; excess
income means that the applicant will be
required to shoulder more of [his or] her
health care costs for that month.
Ken Bresin, Utah's Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988)
(emphasis added)(footnote omitted).

the DHCF's authority17, seem to evince a legislative concern for
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring
"resource spend down," on the contrary, appear concerned about
preserving the limited assets of Medicaid applicants.
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt "resource spend
down" in an otherwise completely optional state benefit plan.
The expressed legislative concern is for economy and efficiency
in implementing a Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this
line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power.
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to that of Maine,
recently reviewed in Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me.
1991). In Harriman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
recognized that its state plan does not include "resource spend
down." "If the assets of applicants exceed the specified dollar
limit, they are ineligible for assistance under the medically
needy program, regardless of the amount of their medical
expenses." Id. at 1056. Noting that "[t]he overall effect was
to restrict as much as possible the number of eligible Medicaid
recipients," the court stated: "For whatever reason—whether to
achieve cost containment or to comply only with the federal
mandate or through simple oversight—the legislature stopped
short of enacting an asset spend-down." Id. at 1057 (footnote
omitted).
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing in the Utah
Medicaid plan or its regulations that requires the utilization of
"resource spend down."18 Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings
17.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 2 6-18-2.3(1) quoted above.

18. We agree with most courts which have considered the issue
and believe the adoption of "resource spend down" is good public
policy. See e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spenddown provision furthers the general purpose of the Medicaid
program); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Clearly, if the goal of
Medicaid is to assist individuals who are medically needy—
defined as having insufficient income or resources to meet the
cost of necessary medical services—the sensible solution is the
spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 N.E.2d at 823 (a state's
adoption of resource spend down "would be in conformity with the
purpose and spirit of the Act"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318 ("Our
review of the case law reveals a pattern where Medicaid
applicants are blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply
because it is so illogical. Applicants who otherwise qualify are
(continued.. .)

account at the time he applied for Medicaid. The DHCF, thus,
correctly determined he was ineligible for Medicaid benefits as
Utah has not adopted a "resource spend down" system.

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in
part):
I concur with part I of the main opinion and dissent from
part II.
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may have been eligible
for Medicaid by spending down his or her assets is a policy
decision delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1)
(1989). We review for reasonableness an agency's policy based on
a legislative grant of discretion to interpret a statute. See
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d
581 (Utah 1991).l

18. (...continued)
denied coverage because they have several hundred dollars above
the reserve asset limit while at the same time they are liable
for tens of thousands of dollars worth of medical bills.").
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility criteria
for Medicaid benefits is not one for the courts to make.
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an expression of intent to limit
coverage. The Legislature's concern for economy and efficiency
in the administration of the program simply does not have any
logical relationship to the intended coverage of the program.

I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is reasonable
since eligibility is determined by when the medically needy
applicant applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, the
applicant who is savvy enough to spend down his or her assets
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not
eligible. Because that agency policy is not reasonable, I would
allow Allen to spend down his assets before his eligibility is
determined.
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
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B810-304-411. Exempt Assets.
Kdlow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See
!§ection 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent Medi.^EaVcases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use
jgi£F or C policy.
* *One Home and Lot — All Cases
xclude one home, including a mobile home, and
tSwned or being purchased and occupied by the
Sent
fF and C Cases — The lot on which the home
j shall not exceed the average size of residential
arin the community where it is. Count the equity
tffiejof property exceeding an average size lot.
^A,~B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all
iious property.
inpt a life estate in a home if the owner of the
ate continues to live in the home.
fOne Home and Lot of a Person Who is A ResifdenT^Sf a Medical Institution — All Cases
SgTOenaperson who owns a home, or life estate in a
liome, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the
home or life estate becomes countable unless:
tVL.The person's stay in the medical institution will
be~short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says
that"the client is likely to return home within 6
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution
more than 6 months after admission is long term, or
-J)7The person states that he intends to return
home. It does not matter whether the person actually
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit
to this exemption. The statement of intent must be in
.writing from the client or his representative, or
', .c^The person has a spouse, dependent child, or reli v e * who lives in the home.
.0. Water Rights — All Cases
S Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot.
^-jfelative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter,
^stepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, stepmother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece,
iS?P&©w, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sisjgS&krother, stepbrother, or stepsister
^^Hou8ehold Goods and Personal Effects
gand C Cases
dude the contents of the home that are essential
ugJiving. However, individual items with an
^J&over $1,000 must be counted against the asset
iP, and D Cases
?«ude household goods and personal effects only
* ^extent they do not exceed $2,000.
^developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no
- ^ items with a value (as can be currently sold) of

Aumiiiiuiiu^iAVii
$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt
amount to be exceeded.
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or
more, then consider all other household goods and
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards
the household's asset level.
5. Vehicles
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to provide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any
equity value in excess of this amount towards the
household's asset limitation.
_
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regardless of value if:
a. It is necessary for employment; or
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year
for obtaining medical treatment; or
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person.
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or
other such factors to provide transportation for essential daily activities.
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above reasons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess towards the asset limit.
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards
asset limits.
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan.
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9^.
7. Life Insurance
A. B, and D Cases
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the
total face value of all such policies does not exceed
SI.500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all
that individual's policies against the asset limit. Up
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used
as a burial'funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term insurance policies have no cash value, are not resources, and are not used in any way in determining
countable assets.
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)).
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid
on the cash value is greater than that used to compute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of
policies that have been held for a long time. When
there is countable cash value that, combined with
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you
should obtain a current statement of the cash value
F and C Cases
Count the cash value of life insurance policies.
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for
any member of the client's immediate family. This
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave
markers, etc. Also, if a client owns a grave site, the
value of which includes opening and closing, the
value of these services is also excluded.
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include
many of the items exempted in this section. However,
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these types of contracts are merely promising these
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.)
and are considered to be a part of the contract or plan.
They are not evaluated separately. They are considered for exemption under Section 411, (9).
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption for
each eligible household member. Compute this burial
or funeral fund exemption as follows:
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable burial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an
asset.
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by
the total face value of any exempt whole life insurance policies. If the face value of these policies exceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c.
The amount of face value which exceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption level is not
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and
C categories as life insurance is already counted.
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life insurance policies there is still a balance in the burial
or funeral fund exemption, reduce the remaining exemption level by, the cash value of any burial contract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial.
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash
value of non-exempt life insurance policies.
e. If these reductions result in an exemption
greater than S 1,500 then the difference is to be added
to the other countable assets.
11 Any interest which is accrued on an exempt
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset or
as income.
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are separately identified and not commingled with other
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an
outside observer can see that these funds are specifically for the client's burial expense.
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or interest from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan,
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the account must be counted as income. The amount remaining in the fund is still exempt.
If a client has a previously unreported resource
which he claims is to be used for burial:
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it
was either designated or intended for burial. However, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of
application.
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D' case and the resource is not clearly designated as being for burial, it
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the
first day of the month the client intended to set it
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2
years prior to the date of application.
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Cases
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Exclude ownership of beneficial interest in 5J2l
land or account which is held in trust by the United
States, a state, or in a tribal account.
i3ft3
11. Per Capita Tribal Payments
'-^jm
Exlude all per capita payments or any asset purl
chased with per capita payments made to a tzibSu
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribal
12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act —-~ADj
Cases
rSj
Exclude shares received as payment under.thai
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public LaVJ
92-203).
->a
13. Income Producing Property — A,B, and Dj
Cases
"2-jJ
Exclude income producing property from assets!
when the individual's equity in the property does not]
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual]
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any]
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 peroaoM
net annual return* is met. If it is not then count the]
entire equity amount.
-^
Net annual return: The income produced after]
subtracting mortgage payments or other payments]
necessary to generate income.
-j£&
14. Retroactive Social Security Benefits — AH]
Cases
.-3^3
Exempt lump sum retroactive benefits received]
from the Social Security Administration (SSA and;
SSI) for 6 months after the month of receipt -f'
15. Student Benefits
All Cases
Do not count monies from certain sources to un<
graduate students as assets. These sources incli
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships-;
have funds guaranteed by the U.S Commission
Education, including:
— Pell Grants (Formerly BEOG)
a
— SuDolemental Educational Opportunitv G;
SEOG-"
'
'rs
— National Direct Student Loans <NDSL<
Z£
— Guaranteed Student Loans
^
— Stare Student Incentive Grants (SSIG1
b Payments to participants of a service le.
program, such as College Work Study or Universil
Year for Action (UYA).
A, B. and D Cases
Count any monies which remain after the
period covered from an educational grant, 1(
scholarship as an asset.
16. Pension Funds — A, B and D Cases
Do not count money held in a retirement fund;
der a plan administered by an employer or union,
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh'^
count owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A,'
or D medical.
a. Count as an asset any available money vii\_
drawn from the pension starting the month afterit
withdrawn.
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA)
Cases
Do not count any asset, or the interest fr
asset, which is held within the rules of the U;
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any mori<
the asset given to the child as unearned
Uniform Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable
money or property to a child under the age of %
gift can be made to only one child, with on"
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form
includes a statement that the custodian holds
set for the child under the Utah UGMA rul
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Mi
or Social Services.

FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION
• B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments
l t state, or local government programs if
j of the payment is so the client can pay for
f
or social services. This includes payments for
[J rehabilitation. Exclude these payments
-e calendar month following receipt. Do not
"this • exemption with reimbursements for
or social services; money received as reimt must be counted as a resource the first
^following receipt.
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Rule 29. Oral argument
i a) In general. Oral argument will be
all cases unless the court concludes:
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or
(2) The dispositive issue or set of •been recently authoritatively decid
(3) The facts and legal argumen
quately presented in the briefs and
the decisional process would not bef^
aided by oral argument.
(b) Priority of argument. Cases
uled for oral argument in accordance
ing list of priorities:
(1) Appeals from convictions
death penalty has been imposed;
(2) Appeals from convictions in I
nal matters;
(3) Appeals from habeas corpus
other post-conviction proceedings;
(4) Appeals from orders concerning

UTAH* RULES OF APPELLATE" PROCEDURE
zj-t (5) Matters relating to the discipline of attor[!>" (6) Matters relating to applicants v* o have
failed to pass the bar examination;
(7) Petitions for review of Industrial Commisergion orders;
r* (8) Appeals from the orders of the Juvenile
^Cburt;
&»>'(9) Appeals from actions involving public elec-

Itions;
jcp.-(lO) Petitions for review of Public Service
J?~ Commission orders;
§V* (ID Appeals from interlocutory orders;
gV (12) Questions certified to the Supreme Court
&v by a court of the United States;
§* - (13) Original writ proceedings;
y: • (14) Petitions for certiorari that have been
# granted;
\\v (15) Petitions to review administrative agency
t~, orders not included within other categories; and
*>.. (16) Any matter not included within the above
j g categories.
f*(c) Notice by clerk and request by a party for
argument; postponement Not later than 30 days
jpriorjto the term of court in which a case is to be
[submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties
sfhat oral argument is to be permitted, the time and
jplace of oral argument, and the time to be allowed
[each side. Oral argument shall proceed as scheduled
[unless all parties waive the same in writing filed
[with the clerk not later than 15 days from the date of
tthe clerk's notice. A request for postponement of the
'argument or for allowance of additional time must be
fmade by motion filed reasonably in advance of the
relate fixed for hearing.
§|^(d).Order and content of argument. The appellant is entitled to open and conclude the argument
?The opening argument shall include a fair statement
soothe .case. Counsel will not be permitted to read at
|&ngth from briefs, records or authorities.
|^[(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or sepaprate appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at
'asingle argument, unless the court otherwise directs
If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the
action below shall be deemed the appellant for the
purpose of this rule unless the parties otherwise
agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the same argument, care shall oe
taken to avoid duplication of argument.
(f) Non-appearance of parties. If the appeilee
fails to appear to present argument, the court will
hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear
argument on behalf of the appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument.
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the
Parties, a case may be submitted for decision on the
briefs, but the court may direct that the case be argued.
-.(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; re. movaL If physical exhibits other than documents are
L*o be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to
^have them placed in the courtroom before the court
• convenes on the date of the argument. After the argufyfeent,counsel shall remove the exhibits from the
[courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exHiibits are not reclaimed by counsel within a reasont *ble time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall
the destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk
&*aall think best.
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transfer the case, including the record and file of
the case from the tnal court, all papers filed in
the Court of Appeals, and a written statement of
all docket entries in the case up to and including
the certification order, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court The Clerk of the Court of Appeals
shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk of
the trial court that the case has been transferred
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification,
the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall enter the
appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall immediately send notices to all parties and to the clerk
of the trial court that the case has been docketed
and that all further filings will be made with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court The notice shall
state the docket number assigned to the case in
the Supreme Court The case shall proceed before
the Supreme Court to final decision and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these
rules
(4) If the record on appeal has not been filed
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the
date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial
court that upon completion of the conditions for
filing the record by that court, the clerk shall
transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court If, however, the record on appeal
has already been transmitted to and filed with
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the date of
the entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals shall transmit the record on
appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within
five days of the date of the entry of the order of
transfer
(c) Criteria for transfer The Court of Appeals
shall consider certification onlv in the following
cases
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is
apparent that the case should be decided by the
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court
would probably grant a petition for a writ of cer
tiorari in the case if decided by the Court of Ap
peals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals
might rule, and
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other
cases involving the same legal issue or issues
pending in the district courts, juvenile courts cir
cuit courts, or the Court of Appeals or which are
cases of first impression under state or federal
law which will have wide applicability
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.
If a notice of appeal or a petition for re\ lew is filed
in a timely manner but is pursued in an appellate
court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the
appellate court, either on its own motion [orj on mo
tion of anv party, shal1 transfer the case, including
the record on appeal all motions and other orders
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with
appellate jurisdiction in the case The clerk of the
transferring court shall give notice to all parties and
to the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring
the case The time for filing all papers in a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time
schedule of the receiving court
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a
judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to
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as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of
certiorari.
Review by a writ of certioran is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only for special and important reasons The following,
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law,
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law m a
way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court,
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision, or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled bv
the Supreme Court
Rule 47 Certification and transmission of
record; filing; parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and serv ice Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the tune
provided b> Rule 48 pay the certiorari docketing fee
and file ten copies of a petition w hich shall comply in
all respects with Rule 49 The case then will be placed
on the certiorari docket Counsel for the petitioner
shall serv e four copies of the petition on counsel for
each party separatelv represented It shall be the ;
duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties
in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari
docket number of the case Serv ice and notice shall be
given as required b\ Rule 21
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointlv, severally, or otherwise m a decision
mav join in a petition for a writ of certiorari, any one
or more of them maj petition separatelv or any two
or more of them mav join in a petition When two or
more cases are sought to be reviewed on certioran
and involve identical or closelv related questions, it
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases
io Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a
respondent wishing to file a cross-petition shall,
within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pav the certiorari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari which shall comply in all
respects with Rule 49 The cross-petition will then be
placed on the certiorari docket Counsel for the crosspetitioner shall serve four copies of the cross-petition
on counsel for each party separately represented. &
shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to
notify all parties in the case of the date of the filM
and of the certiorari docket number of the case. SeH
vice and notice shall be given as required by R^6^?3
A cross-petition for a writ of certioran may n<*~3jj
joined with any other filing, the clerk shall not accepjj
any filing so joined
# *%!!
(d) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in •"5
Court of Appeals shall be deemed parties in the S**
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TITLE XIX. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
CROSS REFERENCES
This Title is referred to in 7 USCS §§ 2026, 3178; 8 USCS § 1522: 12 USCS
§§1715w, 1715z-7: 25 USCS §1622; 38 USCS §§622, 4108: -2 USCS
§§ 242b, 254a-1, 254b, 254c, 254e, 254h, 254n, 300e, 300e-6, 300m-6. 300z-5.
602, 603, 606, 614, 632a, 671, 671, 673, 705, 709, 1301, 1306, 1308, 1309,
1310, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1320a-l, 1320a-2, 1320a-3, 1320a-5, 1320a-7. 1320a7a, 1320a-8, 1320b-2, 1320b-3, 1320b-4, 1320b-5. 1320c-2, 1320c-10, 1382.
13S2g. 1382h, 1382i, 1383c, 1395b-l, 1395%. 1395x, 1395y,-1395z !395cc.
139:>mm. 1395H, I395w. 1395ww, 1997, 3013. 3026, 3035b,'$624
§ 1396. Appropriations
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or
self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et
seq.]. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making
payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the
Secretary, State plans for medical assistance.
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, P. L.
89-97, Title I, Part 2, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343: Dec. 31, 1973, P. L. 93-233,
§ 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, Division B. Title VI.
Subtitle D, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.)
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(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of
applicants or recipients of assistance under the plan who are nor
receiving aid or assistance under anv plan of the State approved under
title I. X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [^2 USCS §§ 301 et seq.,
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B)
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are,
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any applicant
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for
aid or assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.],
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]) as would not be
disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or
661
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(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not
eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under
State law;
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(17) except as provided in subsections (0(3). and (mX4)[,J include reasonable standards (which shall
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I,
X. XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV (42 USCS §§ 301 ct seq.. 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.]. (B) provide

391

42 USCS § 1396a

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with]
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any!
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance tnj
the form of money payments under any plan of the State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, ofj
part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq.. 1201 ct seq., 1351 ct seq., 1381 et seq.. 601 et seq.]. or tol
have paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS]
§§ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining hisl
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, ( Q provide for reasonable evaluation of any suchl
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual]
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is suchj
individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to Slates eligible tol
participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or]
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c],'
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such program); and provide for
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except
to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums;'
payments made to the State under section 1903(0(2XB) [42 USCS § 1396b(Q(2)(B)]. or otherwise and
regardless of whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of the State or
political subdivision thereof) incurred for medical care or for any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law;
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(34) provide that in the case of any individual who has been determined
to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan, such assistance will
be made available to him for care and services included under the plan
and furnished in or after the third month before the month in which he
made application (or application was made on his behalf in the case of a
deceased individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon
application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the time
such care and services were furnished;
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ARTICLE 3
TESTS OF NEWBORN INFANTS
26-17-21. PKU tests of newborn infants — Board of Health
to establish rules and regulations.
The Board of Health shall establish rules and regulations requiring each
newborn infant to be tested for the presence of phenylketonuria ''PKU) and
other metabolic diseases which may result in mental retardation or brain
damage and for which a preventive measure or treatment is available and for
which a laboratory diagnostic test method has been found reliable
History: L. 1965, ch. 49, § 1; 1967, ch. 174,

Cross-References. — Fees for and restriction on testing, ^ 26-10-6

26-17-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 26-17-22 (L 1965, ch
49, § 2), relating to the penalty for violations

of regulations relating to PKU tests, was repealed by Laws 1967, ch 174, § 162

CHAPTER 18
MEDIGAL ASSISTANCE ACT
Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-7 for the termination date of the Medical Assistance Act.
Section
26-18-1.
26-18-2.
26-18-2.1.
26-18-2.2.
26-18-2.3.
26-18-3.
26-18-3.5.
26-18-4.
26-18-5.

Section
Short title.
Definitions.
Division — Creation.
Director — Appointment
Respo risibilities.
Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment.
Administration of Medicaid program by department.
Copayments by health service recipients, spouses, and parents.
Department standards for eligibility under Medicaid — Funds
for abortions.
Contracts for provision of medical
services — Federal provisions

26-18-6.
26-18-7.
26-18-8.
26-18-9.
26-18-10.
26-18-11.

modifying department rules —
Compliance with Social Security Act
Federal aid — Authority of executive director.
Medical vendor rates.
Enforcement of public assistance
statutes — Contract with Office
of Recovery Services.
Prohibited acts of state or local
employees of Medicaid program
— Violation a misdemeanor.
Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies and standards.
Rural hospitals.

26-18-1. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance
Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch, 126, § 17.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1981,
&- 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to

26-18-4 (L. 1963, ch. 38, §§ 1 to 4; 1969, ch.
197, §§ 64, 65; 1971, ch. 53, § 1), relating to
use of confidential information in research.
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted
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by § 17 of the act. For present provisions relating to confidential information, see Chapter 25
of this title.

26-18-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the
medical programs of the state.
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1.
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10.
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act.
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance
under state medical programs.
(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance
Program established under Section 26-18-10.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, added present
Subsections (2) and (3), designated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6),
and, in Subsection (6), substituted "has received medical or hospital assistance under the

Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance Program established under Section
26-J18-10" for "the department has determined
to be eligible for medical or hospital assistance
under the medical programs of the state "
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U S C § 1396 et seq

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988. ch 21, § 10
makes the act effecti\e on July 1, 1988

26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities.
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of
the department. The director of the division may employ other employees as
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall:
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this
chapter;
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in
compliance with federal law and regulations.
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History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 3.

26-18-3

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment.
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economical manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that
fail to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with
regard to both publicly and privately provided services.
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods,
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to:
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary;
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions;
(c) mandatory ^Jifcltatient, rather than inpatients surgery in appropm
ate cases:
(d) second surgical opinions;
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services;
(f) coordination of benefits; and
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures
and provisions of federal law and regulation.
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effectiveness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreasonable utilization.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 4.
Social Security Act. — Title XIX of the federal Social Secuntv Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et se'q.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10
makes the act effective July 1, 1988.

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
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(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Social Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permitted by law and quality control services.
(4) The department may provide by rule for disciplinary measures and
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively shall
not extend beyond termination from the program or recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, in Subsection (2)
substituted "this chapter, the requirements of
Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations"
for "the requirements of Title XIX and with

regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the
federal agency" and made various minor phraseology and stylistic changes,
Social Security Act. — Title XIX of the fede r a i Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 81 C J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 126.
Key Numbers. — Social Security «=» 241

26-18-3.5. Copayments by health
spouses, and parents.

service

recipients,

The department shall selectively provide for*enrollment fees, premiums,
deductions, cost sharing or other similar charges to be paid by recipients, their
spouses, and parents, within the limitations of federal law and regulation.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 135, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L Rev 115, 169

26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Medicaid — Funds for abortions.
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating
to eligibility under the Medicaid program. An applicant receiving Medicaid
assistance may be limited to particular types of care or services or to payment
of part or all costs of care determined to be medically necessary.
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or
other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the life of
the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed.
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(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abortion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and subject to forfeiture of office.
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical treatment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is guilty
of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice medicine
or authority to provide medical services and treatment.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L.
1981, ch~ 126, § 17; 1987, ch. 181, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted former Subsection (1), relating to
the responsibility of counties, redesignated the
subsequent subsections accordingly and made

minor changes in phraseology throughout the
section
Cross-References. — Penalties for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301
Sentencing for felonies, §§76-3-201,
76-3-203, 76-3-301

26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical services —
Federal provisions modifying department rules
— Compliance with Social Security Act.
(1) The department may contract with other public or private agencies to
purchase or provide medical services in connection with the programs of the
division. Where these programs are used by other state agencies, contracts
shall provide that other state agencies transfer the state matching funds to
the department in amounts sufficient to satisfy needs of the specified program.
(2) AU contra©tevfor the provision or purchase of medical services shalLbe**
established on the basis of the state's fiscal year and shall remain uniform
during the fiscal year insofar as possible. Contract terms shall include provisions for maintenance, administration, and service costs.
(3) If a federal legislative or executive provision requires modifications or
revisions in an eligibility factor established under this chapter as a condition
for participation in medical assistance, the department may modify or change
its rules as necessary to qualify for participation; providing, the provisions of
this section shall not apply to department rules governing abortion.
(4) The department shall comply with all pertinent requirements of the
Social Security Act and all orders, rules, and regulations adopted thereunder
when required as a condition of participation in benefits under the Social
Security Act.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sentence of Subsection (1) substituted "division"
for "department" and in Subsection (3) substi-

tuted "its rules as necessary" for "department
rules necessary/'
Social Security Act — The federal Social
Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et
geq.
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26-18-6. Federal aid — Authority of executive director.
The executive director, with the approval of the governor, may bind the
state to any executive or legislative provisions promulgated or enacted by the
federal government which invite the state to participate in the distribution,
disbursement or administration of any fund or service advanced, offered or
contributed in whole or in part by the federal government for purposes consistent with the powers and duties of the department. Such funds shall be used
as provided in this chapter and be administered by the department for purposes related to medical assistance programs.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.

26-18-7. Medical vendor rates.
Medical vendor payments made to providers of services for and in behalf of
recipient households shall be based upon predetermined rates from standards
developed by the division in cooperation with providers of services for each
type of service purchased by the division. As far as possible, the rates paid for
services shall be established in advance of the fiscal year for which funds are
to be requested.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-7, enacted by L.
.J.B3JU ch. 126, *> 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sentence twice-substituted "dmsion" for "department"
— ^ » **>».-.

26-18-8. Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Contract with Office of Recovery Services.
(1) The department shall enforce or contract for the enforcement of the
provisions of Sections 62A-9-121, 62A-9-129, 62A-9-131 through 62A-9-133,
and 62A-9-135 insofar as these sections pertain to benefits conferred or administered by the division under this chapter.
(2) The department may contract for services covered in Part 1, Chapter 11,
Title 62A insofar as that chapter pertains to benefits conferred or administered by the division under this chapter
History: C. 1953, 26-18-8, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 1, § 2; 1988, ch.
21, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Chapter 1, effective January 19, 1988,
substituted the present statutory references for
"Sections 55-15a-24, and 55-15a-29 through
55-15a-33" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 15c
of Title 55" in Subsection (2).

The 1988 amendment b> Chapter 21, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "division" for
"department" throughout the section
This section has been reconciled by the Offlce of
Legislative Research and General Counse
*
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26-18-9. Prohibited acts of state or local employees of
Medicaid program — Violation a misdemeanor.
Each state or local employee responsible for the expenditure of funds under
the state Medicaid program, each individual who formerly was such an officer
or employee, and each partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited for
a period of one year after termination of such responsibility from committing
any act, the commission of which by an officer or employee of the United
States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a
partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by Section 207 or Section
208 of Title 18, United States Code Violation of this section is a class A
misdemeanor
History: C. 1953, 26-18-9, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126. $ 17.
Compiler's Notes. — 18 U S C §§ 207 and
208 deal respectively with participation by former federal officers or employees in matters
involving the government and with mvolve-

ment by federal officers or employees in their
official capacity in matters in which they have
a personal financial interest
Cross-References. — Penalty for misdemeanors, H 76-3-204, 76-3-301

26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies
and standards,
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons who
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act.
(2) Persons in the^custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other nonmedical government institutions are not eligible for services provided underthis section
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relating to eligibility requirements for participation in the program, and for payment of medical claims for eligible persons.
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is rendered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the
spouse, father, mother, and adult children of the person making application.
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or services are covered under the program, including duration of care, and method
of payment, which may be partial or in full.
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospital, or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion
were not performed.
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this
section.
History: C 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 26, § 1; 1985, ch. 165, § 38; 1987,
ch. 181, § 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982,
ch- 26, § 1 repealed former § 26-18-10 (C.
1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126,

§ 17), relating to duties of the department, and
enacted present § 26-18-10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted "equivalent of .00005" for
"equivalent of V4 mill" in two places in Subsection (6).
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The 1987 amendment, effective July 1,1987,
in Subsection (1), substituted "Medicare under
Title XVm of that act" for "Medicare under
Title XVII of said act," deleted former Subsection (6), which provided for relief of the obligation of counties to provide medical care to the
indigent, and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988,
substituted "division" for "department" in Sub-

sections (1) and (4) and in Subsection (1) inserted "which shall be known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program."
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act, cited in Subsection
(1), appears as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396s. Title XVm of the act appears as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395 to 1395ccc.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah's
Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility

Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp.
L. 1 (1988).

26-18-11. Rural hospitals.
(1) For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a hospital located
outside of a standard metropolitan statistical area, as designated by the
United States Bureau of the Census.
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance
Program, the Division of Health Care Financing shall not discriminate among
rural hospitals on the basis of size.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-11, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 12, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 12, § 2
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

CHAPTER 19
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT
Section
26-19-1.
26-19-2.
26-19-3
26-19-4.
26-19-5.

26-19-6.
26-19-7.

26-19-8.

Section
Short title.
Definitions.
Program established by department — Promulgation of rules.
Repealed.
Recovery of medical assistance
from third party liable for payment — Notice — Action —
Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action protected — Limit on payment for
liability.
Action by department — Notice to
recipient.
Action or claim by recipient —
Consent of department required
— Department's right to intervene — Department's interests
protected — Attorney's fees and
costs.
Statute of limitations — Survival
of right of action — Insurance

26-19-9 to
26-19-13.

26-19-14

26-19-15.
26-19-16
26-19-17.
26-19-18.
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policy not to limit time allowed
for recovery
26-19-12. Repealed
Recovery of medical assistance
payments from recipient —
Lien against estate — Recovery
of incorrectly paid amounts.
Insurance policies not to deny or
reduce benefits of persons eligible for state medical assistance
— Exemptions.
Attorney general or county attorney to represent department.
Department's nght to attorney's
fees and costs.
Application of provisions contrary
to federal law prohibited.
Release of medical billing information by provider restricted —
Liability for violation.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT

CHAPTER 17
MENTAL HEALTH
(Repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162; 1969, ch. 197, § 187; 1971, ch. 172, § 27;
1988, ch. 1, § 407; 1989, ch. 22, § 51.)

26-17-1 to 26-17-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 22, § 51 repeals
this chapter, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 54
and by Laws 1987. ch. 180, § 1; 1987, ch. 179,
§ 8. and 1967, ch. 174, § 153 and as amended
by Laws 1969. ch. 197, §§ 60 and 63; 1979, ch.
233.* l:1987,ch 141, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, §§ 1,

3 to 7, and 9; 1967, ch. 174, §§ 36 and 147;
1980, ch. 30, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, § 3; and 1981,
ch 120, § 3, effective April 24, 1989. For
Dresent comparable provisions, see Chapter 12
of Title 62 A.

CHAPTER 18
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-226 provides that the Medical Assistance Act is repealed July 1.
1994
Section
26-18-3.

Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disci-

plinary measures and sanctions
— Funds collected,

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
Minset"Act:~=^—Section 63-55-226 provides
that the Division of Health Care Financing is
repealed July 1, 1994.

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disciplinary measures and sanctions —
Funds collected.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permitted by law and quality control services.
(4) The department shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures
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of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not
extend beyond:
(a) termination from the program;
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social
Security Act.
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the Greneral
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance
with the requirements of that section.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989,
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a)
and (b) designations in Subsection (4); substituted "shall provide, by rule" for "may provide
by rule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not
extend" in the introductory language of Subsection (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsection (4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-

tion (4)(b); added Subsection (4)(c); made punctuation changes throughout Subsection (4);
and added Subsection (5).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Subsection (3).
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U S.C.
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42
U.S.C. § 1396r.

CHAPTER 19
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT
Section
26-19-2.
26-19-5.

26-19-7

26-19-2.

Section
Definitions
Recovery of medical assistance
from third party liable for payment — Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or waiver
— Recipient's right to action
protected
Action or claim b\ recipient —
Consent of department required

26-19-18

— Department s right to intervene — Department's interests
protected — Attorney's fees and
costs
Release of medical billing information by pro\ ider restricted —
Exception — Liability for violation

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act.
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest.
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a
recipient.
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and
survivors if he is deceased.
(5) "Third party" means:
44

63-46b-15

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
(b) The appellate rule* of the appropriate
pellate court shall govern all additional,f
and proceedings in the appellate court s L .
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing^jf
agency's record for judicial review of formal adraL_
tive proceedings are governed by the UtabRuKg
Appellate Procedure, except that:
'-• *..••)&
(a) all parties to the review proceedings
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or oi
record;

(b) the appellate court may tax the cost
paring transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably*re?,
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize of'1
organize the record; or
-\
(ii) according to any other provision of«
law.
.^-r!
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if oV*
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a i
person seeking judicial review has been substantially ]
prejudiced by any of the following:
*
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on I
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-1
tional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-"
tion conferred by any statute;
- t
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
*
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an u n l a w f u l ' p ^
cedure or decision-making process, or hasT
*o follow prescribed procedure;
f» the persons taking the agency actfol
iegalh constituted as a decision-making
r A ere subject to disqualification;
"rf
g) the agency action is based upon a del
-.azion of fact, made or implied by the~j_
*"^a: is not supported by substantial" evidence;
N-cn Mewed in light of the whole record before
-c court,
- trie agencv action is
—--JJSS
l* an abuse of the discretion delegatedjKM
r
ie agenc\ D% statute,
^r*£
n) contrary to a rule of the a g e n c y ; ^ § |
'in) contrary to the agency's prior^PJJfU
nee, unless the agency justifies the i n c o n r " *
tency by giving facts and reasons thatjcU
onstrate a fair and rational basis for thenu
consistency, or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capriciousr'l**.

63-46b-16.

J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — Formal adjudicative p r o c e e d i n g s .
(1) As provided by s t a t u t e , the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals h a s jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting firom formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rule*
of the appropriate appellate court

78-2a-4

JUDICIAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Post-conviction review.
Post-conviction review may be used to attack
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook,
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
—Sentence reduction.
Cited.

Scope.
This statute defines the outermost limits of
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of
Appeals to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of
review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing the court to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute specifically creating a right to judicial review. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Habeas corpus proceedings.
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is sufficiently broad to include those cases where a
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging extradition.
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to
his underlying criminal conviction, except that
"but for" the conviction, he would not have
been incarcerated in Arizona and then transferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the postconviction actions of the board of pardons and
did .not challenge the conviction in the trial
court or the sentence, and the fact that defendant was serving a sentence for a first-degree
felony did not require a transfer to the Supreme Court under the circumstances. Northern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

—Sentence reduction.
When a conviction is reduced under
§ 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in
the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of
crime charged in the information or found in
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168
(Utah 1991).
Cited in Scientific Academy of ftair Design,
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242* (Utah Ct. App.
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.

78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 47.
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For text of Act sec p. 305
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675]
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965)
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965
Senate July 9, July 28, 1965
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out.
S E N A T E R E P O R T NO. 40 i

« H E Ccrrmittee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H R. 6675 >
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social
Security Ac: with a supplementary health benefits program and an expanded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the oldage, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the FederalState public assistance programs, and for other purposes, having considered the s?^e report favorably thereon with amendments and recommerJ
that the b:'. cc pass.

PART I
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The overall purpose of H.R. 6675 is as follows:
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled,
and families with dependent children.
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-year
program of ''special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care
and services for needy children (including those who are emotionally disturbed) of school age or preschool age.
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6.

I M P R O V E M E N T AND E X T E N S I O N O F KERR-MILLS
MEDICAL A S S I S T A N C E PROGRAM

(a) Background
The provision of medical care for the needy has long been a responsibility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years,
the Federal Government has assisted the States and localities in carrying this responsibility by participating in the cost oi the care provided.
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the States,
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in behalf of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children—the socalled vendor payments.
Several times since 1950, the Congress has liberalized the provisions
o: law under which the States administer the State-Federal program of
medical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was
in 1960 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program
was authorized. This legislation offers generous Federal matching to
o* able the States to provide medical care in behalf of aged persons who
rave enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for
:r-. heal care costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 States
:r.d 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged
were aided in March 1965. Furthermore, medical care as a part of the
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years
v:t*il, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some
items of medical care for at least some of the needy.
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which
States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make medical
services for the needy more generally available. To accomplish this objective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a
new title in the Social Security Act—'Title X I X : Grants to the States
for Medical Assistance Programs."
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967,
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Programs of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be
optional with the States.
(b) State plan requirements
(1) Standard provisions
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of requirements for State plans which are either identical to the existing provisions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are:
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State.
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted
upon with reasonable promptness.
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary
may from time to time require.
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness.
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye cr
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select.
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom.
(2) Additions to standard provisions
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either
new or changed over provisions currently in the law.
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expenditures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial participation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This provision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local
funds for financing of any part of the program not afTect the amount,
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire nonFederal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives,
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy.
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the requirement that such methods must include provisions for utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is important that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program including both medical and
other professional staff.
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan include a description of the standards, methods, and administrative arrangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no authority to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is somewhat analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assistance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requiring States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-

2015

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ing raid maintaining standards for private or public institutions in which
recipients may receive care or services.
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after June
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standards
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) relating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and safety of individuals, which are established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The committee assumes that the standards prescribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those prescribed by the Secretary.
The House bill provided that the State or local agency administering
the State plan under title X I X shall be the same agency which is currently administering cither title I (old-age assistance) or that part of
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medical
assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relating to the aged is State supervised, the same State agency shall supervise the administration of title X I X .
The committee believes that the States should be given the opportunity to select the agency they wish to administer the program. A number
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief
that the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility
under this program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility
for medical assistance be made by the State or local agency administering State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees
with the statement in the House report that the welfare agencies have
''long experience and skill in determination of eligibility/'
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on
the date a State submits its title X I X plan, the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind under title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or supervise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which relates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan.
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agencies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of
care in many medical institutions arc not now at a satisfactory level and
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these standards will be enforced by the appropriate State body.
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the effect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the quality of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such procedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with medical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of
services under the State plan.
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation of all State
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation.
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include
provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or assistance under State plans approved under titles I, IV, X / X I V , and XVI.
It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical
assistance to the less needy.
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must not be less
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid
under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration,
and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all
such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy
aided under the federally aided categories oi assistance.
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their programs to
include assistance for persons who come within the various categories of
assistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet
their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals
shall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that mace available for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was included in order to make sure, that the most needy in a State receive no
less comprehensive care than those who are not as needy.
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not receiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among
the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recipients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance programs. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be
comparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a
comparability for that set for families with children who, except for
their income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope,
amount, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these
groups must be equal.
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this provision as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in institutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participat e Ccr.g. & Asr.in.News '65—127
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t:*jn is authorized only with respect to recipients aged 65 and over in
rr.cntal and tuberculosis institutions so it would not be appropriate to
include them within the scope of this provision.
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance
The committee bill would make more specific a provision now in the
law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the
plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources
which individuals may hold and be eligible for aid, they must do so by
maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy
people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be
that which is applicable for the eligibility of the needy aged, for example,
shall be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the eligibility for the needy blind and disabled; and must also have a comparability
to the standards used to determine the eligibility of those v. ho are to receive medical assistance as needy children and the parents cr other relatives caring for them.
Another provision is included that requires States to take into account
<~-\\y such income and resources as (determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary), arc actually available to the applicant
or recipient and as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future
r.Leds) in determining the eligibility for and the amount of the aid or assistance in the form of money payments for any such applicant or recipient under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriately applicable to him. Income and resources taken into account, furthermore,
must be reasonably evaluated by the States. These provisions are designed so that the States will not assume the availability of income which
may not, in fact, be available or overevaluate income and resources which
are available. Examples of income assumed include support orders from
absent fathers, which have not been paid or contributions from relatives
which are not in reality received by the needy individual.
The committee has heard of hardships on certain individuals by requiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled children even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for
medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationsliips among
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who arc blind
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, will be taken into account
by the State in determining whether the individual applying for medical
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance.
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under
the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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grams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the
medical care he requires.
This determination must be made by the agency administering the oldage assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency.
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount.
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources
which would bring the individual's income below the amount established
as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for
his maintenance.
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan.
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with respect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This provision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided under
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hospital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or resources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level)
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary
and included in the State plan.
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this
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provision, which it is expected will protect the income and resources an
individual has which are necessary for his nonmedical needs.
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisions
of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in connection
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits. The committee is
concerned that hospitalization be readily available to needy persons and
that the necessity of their pa\ing deductibles or cost sharing shall not be
a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their receiving the
hospitalization they need. For this reason, the committee's bill provides
that the States make provisions, for individuals 65 years or older who
are included in the new plan, of the cost of any deductible or cost sharing
imposed with respect to individuals under the program established by the
hospital insurance provisions of the bill.
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payment in full
of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program established by part B of title XVIII. In the event, however, the State plan pro\idcs for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, such portion
shall be determined on a basis reasonably related to the individual's income, or income and resources and in conformity with stardards issued
by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to issue standards—under
this provision which, it is expected, will protect the income and resources
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the States. Such
standards shall protect the income and resources of the indhidual needed
for his maintenance and provide assurance that the responsibility placed
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burden on them.
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged program now provide that the States may not impose a lien against the
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning incorrect payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts correctly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death and
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee bill,
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recovery would be
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is under the
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
(e) Scope and definition of medical services
"Medical assistance'* is defined under the bill to mean pa\ment of all
or part of the cost of care and sen-ices for individuals who would if
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), and
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 406(b)
(1) with whom the child is living, or who arc 65 years of age and older,
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, as
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of medical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the individual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the program
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children as
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and their
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except for
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